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Quantum Meruit and Building Contracts 
H O Hunter and J W Carter* 
PART II—DOES THE CONTRACT PRICE PUT A CEILING 
ON A RECOVERY VIA A QUANTUM MERUIT? 
Introduction 
The question posed by the title of this part of the article has been the subject 
of a substantial amount of commentary by American Legal scholars1 and has 
been a central issue in a number of cases, almost all of them involving building 
contracts. The problem is easy to state: P and D have an agreement for P to 
construct a building for a total consideration of $X. When P is partially finished, 
D breaches.2 If the contract price and the value of the work to date roughly 
coincide, there is usually little problem in determining P's recovery. The 
standard rule of measurement is: expenses incurred to date plus expected profit 
(the 'benefit of the bargain'). Difficulties arise when the value of P's work 
exceeds the contract price. We are thus concerned in this part with valid and 
enforceable contracts which have as their distinguishing feature, from the 
builder's perspective, an element of unprofitability. There are in fact two main 
situations, or reasons for this scenario. 
(1) The contract may have been a bad bargain from its inception, either because 
the builder underquoted for the entire project or because of an error in 
relation to a significant part of the project. 
(2) The contract may have become a bad bargain because of subsequent events, 
including (a) incompetence on the part of the builder in execution of the 
contract; (b) an adverse movement in market prices; (c) interference by 
the other party; or (d) unforeseen events, perhaps amounting to frustration 
of the contract. 
In either case, at the time when the builder claims to be entitled to the quantum 
meruit, market prices exceed the contract price. Thus, if $Y represents the 
market price of the work at the time of D's breach, and $X represents the 
contract price (or the rateable proportion), then 
* Part I of this article appeared in the previous issue of the JCL. 
1 See, eg Dobbs, Remedies, 1973, §12.1; Childres & Garamella, 'The Law of Restitution and the Reliance 
Interest in Contract', (1969) 64 Nw UL Rev 433; Palmer, 'The Contract Price as a Limit on Restitution 
for Defendant's Breach', (1959) 20 Ohio State LJ 264. 
2 It is critical whether the breach is so substantial that it amounts to a repudiation that frees P from the 
obligation to continue to perform. If D's breach is relatively minor, P may be obligated to perform but 
have a claim for damage against D. See generally EA Farnsworth, Contracts, 1982, § 8.8; H O Hunter, 
Modern Law of Contracts: Breach and Remedies, 1986, §§ 2.02, 3.02; K E Lindgren, J W Carter and 
D J Harland, Contract Law in Australia, 1986, Ch 19; Rosett, 'Partial, Qualified, and Equivocal 
Repudiation of Contract', (1981) 81 Colum L Rev 93; Seepersad, 'Restitution and Total Failure of 
Consideration', (1973) 123 New LJ 435. 
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$Y > $X 
and the debate is whether P may recover $Y or is restricted to a smaller sum 
awarded by way of restitution or damages. The smaller sum will not be the 
contract price because P has not completed the work. Indeed, if completion 
of the contract would have caused a loss to P in excess of the contract value 
of the work done the sum might be purely nominal if awarded as damages. 
Our attention is mainly directed to the case where the builder has, to put it 
colloquially, done his or her sums badly in the first place, but some reference 
will also be made to the other situations. 
The Majority View in the USA 
The issue has been the subject of many cases in the United States. By contrast, 
English and Australian authority is sparse. 
In the United States the dominant view is that P, the non-breaching party, 
may recover on a quantum meruit even if that recovery exceeds the maximum 
contract price. Perhaps the most influential discussion of the issue appeared 
in the case of United States for the Use and Benefit of Susi Contracting Co 
v Zara Contracting Co.3 Zara won a United States Government contract to 
do excavation, grading and compaction work in connection with an airport 
expansion. Zara then sub-contracted most of the work to Susi. Disputes 
developed because of unexpected soil conditions that complicated the job. Zara 
terminated the sub-contract and completed the job using equipment Susi had 
furnished. Susi then sued for the reasonable cost and value of the actual work 
performed plus the rental value of the equipment. In finding generally for Susi 
the court stated: 
For it is an accepted principle of contract law, often applied in the case of construction 
contracts, that the promisee upon breach has the option to forego any suit on the 
contract and claim only the reasonable value of his performance . . . 
It also appears to be the general view, save for an occasional case viewed as 
illogical by the text writers, who are solidly in support of the doctrine . . . 
These authorities make it quite clear that under the better rule the contract price 
or the unit price per cubic yard of a construction or excavation contract does not 
limit recovery. This doctrine is particularly applicable to unit prices in construction 
contracts; . . . a plaintiff may well have completed the hardest part of a job for 
which an average cost had been set. But it seems settled now in New York that 
with the breach fall all the other parts of the contract.4 
There are two justifications offered by the courts for this result. The first 
it that of fictitious rescission ab initio. The breaching party is said to have 
'offered' to rescind by the breach and termination. The non-breaching party 
can 'accept' this rescission by electing to sue in restitution for the value of 
goods and services provided to the defendant as if there never had been a 
3 146 F 2d 606 (2d Cir 1944). The opinion was written by Judge Clark, and the other panel members were 
Judges Chase and L Hand. All three were respected judges on issues of commercial law. Another early 
and influential case was City of Philadelphia v Tripple 230 Pa 480; 79 A 703 (1911). 
4 146 F 2d 606 at 610 (2d Cir 1944). The court cited in support cases from California, Connecticut, Maryland, 
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania as well as New York plus Restatement of Contracts, § 347 (1932); 
McCormick on Damages, § 166; Williston on Contracts, Vol 5, § 1485; Woodward on Quasi-Contracts 
§§ 268, 269; Patterson, 'Builder's Measure of Recovery for Breach of Contract', (1931) 31 Colum L 
Rev 1286. 
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contract. In the case of Scaduto v Orlando5 the court said: 
[The plaintiff] can 'rescind' the contract and sue in quantum meruit for the value 
of his services, which is measured, not by the contract rate, but by the actual value 
of labour and materials . . . and the impact of the rule is to permit the promisee 
to 'rescind' even a contract upon which he would have lost money and base his 
recovery on the value of the services which he gave to the defendant irrespective 
of whether he would have been entitled to recovery in a suit on the contract.6 
The second justification focuses more explicitly on the notion of fault that 
seems to pervade these cases. The contract price does not set a ceiling on 
recovery because the breaching party forfeits his or her rights under the contract 
by reason of the breach.7 Fault and the loss of any rights under the contract 
by the breaching party were express concerns of the California Supreme Court 
in Boomer v Muir,8 another often cited case. 
To hold that payments under the contract may limit the recovery where the contract 
is afterwards rescinded through the defendant's fault seems to us to involve a 
confusion of thought. A rescinded contract ceases to exist for all purposes. How 
then can it be looked to for one purpose, the purpose of fixing the amount of recovery? 
. . . The contract is annihilated so effectively that in contemplation of law it has 
never had any existence even for the purpose of being broken.9 
In the Boomer case the impact of the doctrine was especially apparent. The 
plaintiff's damage claim on a contract action would have amounted to about 
$20,000. His suit on a quantum meruit brought him a recovery of $250,000, 
a difference that is surprisingly large today and that must have been startling 
56 years ago in the midst of the Depression. 
The role of fault was discussed by the court in the Scaduto case in response 
to an argument by the defendant that the contract price should set a ceiling. 
The defendant cited Jones and Jones v Judd,10 a New York case from 1850, 
in which recovery was based on the contract rate. Judge Anderson, writing 
for the court in Scaduto, noted, however, that Jones v Judd was really an action 
for contract damages and not for the quantum meruit. The termination of the 
contract had occurred 'without any fault on the part of the defendant' and, 
therefore, 'the plaintiff lacked the power to rescind, and sue in quantum meruit 
and could only recover at the contract rate to the date of termination''.11 This 
6 81 F 2d 587 at 595 (2d Cir 1967). Interestingly, this approach (breach as an offer to rescind) has been 
used by some courts to allow a modification without consideration. In a leading case an employee under 
contract threatened to leave because a competitor offered him more money. He was given a raise to induce 
him to stay (not to breach). The court upheld the raise, reasoning that there was an offer to rescind, 
an acceptance, and a new contract. This analysis also has provided a way around the problem of Foakes 
v Beer (1884) 9 App Cas 605. See HO Hunter, Modern Law of Contracts: Formation, Performance, 
Relationship of Parties, 1987, § 17.03[2][b]. But the view that a repudiation is in effect an offer to rescind 
has been rejected in England. See Moschi v Lep Air Services Ltd [1973] AC 331 at 349-50 criticising 
Denmark Productions Ltd v Boscobel Productions Ltd [1969] 1 QB 699 at 731. 
7 United States for the Use and Benefit of Coastal Steel Erectors Inc v Algernon Blair Inc 479 F 2d 638 
at 640 (4th Cir 1973). ('In these cases it is no doubt felt that the Defendant's breach should work a forfeiture 
of his right to retain the benefits of an advantageous bargain.') 
8 24 P 2d 570 (Calif Dist Ct App 1933). 
9 24 P 2d 570 at 577 (Calif Dist Ct App 1933). 
10 4 NY 411 (1850). 
11 Scaduto v Orlando 381 F 2d 587 at 595-6, note 8 (2d Cir 1967). 
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language suggests that it is a wilful repudiation of the entire contract that triggers 
the right to rescind (while also relieving the non-breaching party of any further 
obligation to perform) and that, perhaps, the claimant will be limited to contract 
damages if the breach is unintentional or the result of factors outside the direct 
control of the breaching party. How this analysis ties in with the results in 
frustration and commercial impracticability cases is an interesting and difficult 
question that deserves separate consideration. 
Sometimes it is not altogether clear, however, what rationale a court is using. 
In a 1984 decision the Arizona Court of Appeal followed the general rule and 
allowed recovery on a quantum meruit without limitation by the contract price. 
In so doing the court stated 'we are not adopting the common argument that 
since the contract was rescinded it no longer exists, and therefore it cannot 
provide a price limiting the contractor's recovery'.l2 Unfortunately, the court 
failed to state what argument it was adopting nor why it refused to adopt what 
it described as 'the common argument'.13 
The Minority View in the USA 
There remain courts that refuse to follow the majority approach and adhere 
to the view that the contract remains alive at least to impose a ceiling on 
recovery. These cases do not reject, in general, the use of a quantum meruit 
approach to measuring the plaintiff's recovery. They recognise that 
proportionate payments under the contract may be inadequate because the 
plaintiff may have performed the more difficult and costly work, but the 
payment schedule may be based on an average.14 Nevertheless, there is a 
reluctance to allow the plaintiff to recover more man the agreed upon bargain. 
We believe using the contract price as a ceiling, on restitution is the better reasoned 
resolution of this question. Had Johnson [plaintiff] fully performed, his recovery 
would be limited to the contract price, since he would be suing for specific 
performance of the liquidated debt obligation under the contract... it is illogical 
to allow him to recover the full cost of his services when, if he completed the house, 
he would be limited to the contract price plus the agreed upon extras.15 
English and Australian Cases 
In so far as the dominant view in the United States depends on rescission ab 
initio as a remedy for breach of contract it would be difficult to apply to Anglo-
Australian law for the simple fact that, in cases of breach, rescission ab initio 
is not an available right except in cases where it is expressly conferred by 
12 Murdock-Bryant Construction Inc v Pearson 146 Ariz 57; 703 P 2d 1206 at 1217, note 7 (Ariz App 1984). 
13 In fact, this case need not be analysed the same as others in this area. It involved either mistake or deceit 
by the defendant. Plaintiff contracted to do an excavation job based on the defendant's representations 
about soil conditions and rock. The site turned out to contain half again as much rock as the defendant 
had represented. The result was more in the nature of a reformation than in the nature of a restitution. 
14 This was a concern expressed in Susi v Zara. but the result there was to allow recovery of costs and 
expenses without regard to the contract. Compare, eg Kehoe v Rutherford 56 NJL 23, 27 A 912 at 914 
(1893) where the plaintiff was allowed to recover only a ratable proportion of the contract price. ('What 
is done was done under the contact, and should be paid for accordingly.') 
15 Johnson v Bovee 574 P 2d 513 at 514 (Colo App 1978). The other cases on point are substantially older. 
See, eg Edward Thompson Co v Kollmeyer 46 Ind App 400, 92 NE 660 (1910); Reifschneider v Beck 
148 Mo App 725, 129 SW 232 (1910); Cozad v Elam 115 Mo App 136, 91 SW 434 (1905); Massey 
v Taylor, Wood & Co 45 Tenn 447, 98 Am Dec. 429 (1868); Wuchter v Fitzgerald 83 Ore 672, 163 
P 819 (1917). 
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the contract.16 However, the fact that there are authorities which favour such 
a right17 may explain the existence of some support for the view that the contract 
price does not place a ceiling on the plaintiff's recovery. These authorities 
must be tested today against contract theory which treats termination as the 
available right, and a restitution theory which treats termination as a sufficient 
basis for a restitutionary claim.18 
If rescission is not an available remedy for a breach, then it is conceptually 
difficult—some might say impossible—to justify a remedy in restitution which 
ignores the contract. The only remedy would appear to be damages for the 
breach calculated in the normal way. Furthermore, the common law courts 
outside the United States have been reluctant to allow restitutionary remedies 
in disputes arising from broken contracts. Two areas stand out: where the 
plaintiff has sought to make the defendant liable for profits made as a 
consequence of breach; and to allow some measure of return to the party in 
breach.19 
The use of the principles and remedies that are closely aligned with restitution, 
however, is not entirely a recent phenomenon. The nineteenth century case 
of Planché v Colburn20 allowed an author to recover on a quantum meruit 
for work done on a book even though the defendants (publishers) had gone 
out of business and had no need for it and even though the author did not 
complete the work. In Lodder v Slowey21 the Privy Council affirmed a decision 
of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand22 that allowed a plaintiff contractor 
to elect between damages and restitution, on a quantum meruit, after the 
defendants breached and excluded the plaintiff from the site thereby preventing 
him from completing the job. The contract had been for the construction of 
a tunnel and the trial judge refused to award more than a nominal sum because 
there was no evidence that the contract would have been profitable. He also 
rejected the claim for restitution which found favour with the Court of Appeal. 
That court regarded the question of profit as immaterial. Whether this decision 
and the majority view in the United States will be applied in Australia is 
uncertain, although the recent decision of Brownie J in Minister for Public 
Works v Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd.23 does provide some support 
for its application 
Recovery when the Contract is Executed 
Oddly, when the defendant breaches by refusing to pay after full performance 
by the performing party, the only claim is for the price. Thus a performing 
party who has a disadvantageous contract relative to the prevailing market 
16 McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd (1933) 48 CLR 457; Johnson v Agnew [1980] SC 367. 
17 For example, Brooks Robinson Pty Ltd v Rothfield [1951] VLR 405. 
18 See Lindgren, Carter and Harland, Contract Law in Australia, 1986, para 1904. 
19 See G Jones, 'The Recovery of Benefits Gained From a Breach of Contract', (1983) 99 LQR 443 citing 
and discussing, eg Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] Ch 106 at 332; Radford v De Froberville [1977] 1 WLR 
1262; Joyner v Weeks [1891] 2 QB 31. See also A S Burrows, Contract, Tort and Restitution—A Satisfactory 
Division or Not?' (1983) 99 LQR 217 at 232-3; Samuel Stoljar, 'Restitutionary Relief for breach of 
Contract', (1989) 2 JCL 1; J L R Davis, 'Damages' in P D Finn, (ed) Essays on Contract, 1987, p 200 
et seq; J Beatson, 'What Can Restitution do for You?', (1989) 1 JCL 65. 
20 (1883) 8 Bing 14; 131 ER 305. 
21 [1904] AC 442 
22 (1902) 20 NZLR 321. 
23 Unreported, Supreme Court of NSW 15/2/89. 
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value of work will be substantially better off if the paying party terminates 
the agreement prior to completion. This was made clear in United States for 
the Use and Benefit of Harkol Inc v Americo Construction Co Inc,24 a decision 
of a federal court in Massachusetts. The plaintiff was a subcontractor on a 
public works project and began work in June 1955. After a while the general 
contractor had difficulty in making progress payments as they fell due. The 
general contractor was so far in arrears by September 1956 that the 
subcontractor said that it could not proceed. If the subcontractor had held firm, 
it might have been successful in seeking recovery on a quantum meruit.25 
However, the general contractor orally agreed to make payment in full if the 
subcontractor would complete the job. The subcontractor did so, but payment 
still was not forthcoming. Having completed the job, the subcontractor's only 
claim was for the price, and the court rejected a quantum meruit claim on 
the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment.26 
Another court stated that a party to a fully executed contract may recover 
in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of the services, but subject to a 
ceiling of the contract price.27 That may seem like a roundabout way of getting 
to the same result—recovery of the contract price on full performance—but 
in a close case there may be some importance in the distinction. If a performing 
party, who has terminated performance by reason of the non-performing party's 
breach, sues on the contract, the defendant may be able to set off against the 
claim for damages the cost to complete the contract, so long as the defendant 
has not abandoned the contract. (The defendant may have breached the 
agreement, but still want to complete the project.) Bringing suit on the contract 
affirms it, and even though the plaintiff may be relieved of any further obligation 
to perform by reason of the defendant's breach, the contract remains the 
measuring rod. If the cost to complete exceeds the contract price to complete, 
the plaintiff may be unable to recover anything more than progress payments 
due to the date of breach if not already paid.28 The quantum meruit approach 
avoids this problem, because the defendant cannot set off the cost to complete. 
Whatever the variations or justifications among the courts, there does seem 
to be unanimity on the conclusion. The plaintiff has a claim for the price, after 
complete performance, regardless of the market value of the services rendered 
and goods provided by the plaintiff.29 
24 168 F Supp 760 (D Mass 1958). 
25 'When one party to a contract acts in total breach of his obligation the other may cease performance 
and rather than sue for damages, ie, his outlay to the date of the breach plus lost profits . . . he may 
"rescind", and seek to restore the status quo, in which case recovery may be measured by the value 
of the services not limited by the contract price.' 168 F Supp 760 at 761 (D Mass 1958). 
26 The court also rejected the suggestion that the oral agreement of September 1956 superseded the original 
agreement and substituted a fair value standard for the price term. 
27 Dye v Hill 20 Ariz 466, 181 P 462 (1919). 
28 Scaduto v Orlando 381 F 2d 587 at 595, n 7 (2d Cir 1967); Restatement of Contracts, § 329, comment 
g and § 335 (1932). In one sense this is another way of limiting the plaintiff's recovery to the expected 
benefit of the bargain, which may be zero or less if the contract is an unprofitable one. On the other 
hand there are likely to be start-up transaction costs associated with a new contractor coming in to finish 
a job, and it seems unfair to charge those against a plaintiff who has been discharged of the obligation 
to perform further. It is also unclear what role, if any, the concept of fault plays in this analysis. 
29 H O Hunter, Modem Law of Contracts: Breach and Remedies, 1986, §§ 806, 9.02[4]. Section 373(2) 
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) states: 'the injured party has no right to restitution if 
he has performed all of his duties under the contract and no performance by the other party remains due 
other than the payment of a definite sum of money for that performance'. 
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Measuring the Recovery 
When recovery on a quantum meruit is appropriate the standard for measure-
ment 'is the amount for which the services and material supplied could have 
been purchased from one in [plaintiff's] position at the time and place the 
services were rendered'.30 The contract price is evidence of value and it 
certainly may be considered, although it is not conclusive. In the American 
courts the determination of fair value is usually a jury question,31 but some-
times a court may treat a jury's determination as advisory. Proof of fair value 
in a construction case can become extremely complicated because there are 
so many variables.32 There is always the possibility that the contract price may 
be the most compelling evidence because it is certain and because it does 
represent an arm's length deal. 
As a result of the recent series of judgments by members of the High Court 
in the case of Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul33 it is likely that the role of 
restitutionary remedies and the relationship of restitution to contract will become 
matters of intense debate in Australian law circles. 
A point raised by Gareth Jones in an article previously published in the JCL34 
is that except for a brief passage in the judgment of Deane J, none of the 
judgments in Pavey & Matthews addresses the problem of measurement and 
the role of the contract—whether express or implied in fact, enforceable or 
not—in measuring the quantum meruit. It is Jones' view35 that the contract 
is a critical factor in that measurement. 
But claims arising out of contracts which are not enforceable by the plaintiff present their 
own special problems of valuation. For clearly the contract price cannot be ignored; and there 
is good authority that it should not, and should form a ceiling to any recovery. In principle, 
the plaintiff should recover the market value of his services or the contract price, whichever 
is the lower figure. 
There is much to recommend Jones' view. Whether his view prevails 
depends, in large part, on the extent to which Australian courts are influenced 
by American judicial opinions on the same subject. 
Breach by the Performing Party 
The cases that have addressed the central issue of this paper all have involved 
suits by a performing party against a paying party.36 What is the result when 
the performing party breaches? The approach followed by every American 
jurisdiction is to award the plaintiff the difference, if any, between the contract 
30 Scaduto v Orlando 381 F 2d 587; 595 (2d Cir 1967); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 373, comment 
d. (1981); Perillo 'Restitution in the Second Restatement of Contracts', 81 Colum L Rev 37 (1981). Compare 
Fiett v Deniliquin Publishing Co Ltd [1964-65] NSWR 383. 
31 See, eg Bernini v Zylka, 51 AD 2d 689; 379 NYS 2d 104 (1976). 
32 For a general discussion see Douthwaite, Attorney's Guide to Restitution, § 8.2 (1977). On the necessity 
of sound evidence see Development Corp of Ga v Berndt 131 Ga App 277; 205 SE 2d 868 (1974). 
33 (1987) 162 CLR 221. 
34 G Jones, 'Restitution: Unjust Enrichment as a Unifying Concept in Australia?' (1988) 1 JCL 8. 
35 (1988) 1 JCL 8 at 13-14. But compare Minister for Public Works v Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd 
(unreported) Supreme Court of NSW 15/2/89 at 26-9; Rover International Ltd v Cannon Film Sales Ltd 
[1989] 1 WLR 912. 
36 The paying party, eg a general contractor, may be a performing party in co-operation with the other 
party, but the point is that one's main obligation is to provide services and materials and the other's main 
obligation is to pay money. 
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cost to complete and the actual cost to complete37 plus incidental transaction 
costs. This protects the paying party's expectancy; that is, complete 
performance for the agreed upon price. At the same time this approach casts 
upon the breaching party the risk that the contract was substantially below the 
market. If the performing party realises that the contract is unprofitable, it 
may be to his or her advantage to cut losses and breach, but there is the risk 
that nothing will be saved if he is ultimately liable for the cost of completion. 
Presumably the cost of completion also will include a competitor's profit. 
A particularly difficult problem may arise, however, if the cost to complete 
according to the terms of the agreement is grossly disproportionate to the injury 
suffered by the non-breaching party by reason of the defendant's failure to 
complete.38 Two cases illustrate fundamentally different approaches to this 
problem. One, Groves v John Wunder Co,39 strictly applied the cost to complete 
formula; the other, Peevyhouse v Garland Coal & Mining Co,40 refused to 
award the cost to complete because of the great difference between that cost 
and the actual economic injury to the plaintiff. 
The defendant in the Groves case had purchased the right to use part of the 
plaintiff's property as a rock quarry. The contract stipulated that the defendant 
would fill the quarry and reclaim the land after removing the rock, but the 
defendant failed to do so. The evidence showed that the cost of the reclamation 
would be $60,000, but that the diminution in value of the real estate by reason 
of the quarry was $12,000. The defendant argued that the plaintiff would be 
fully compensated by an award equal to the diminution in value, but the court 
held otherwise and ordered payment of a sum equal to the cost of reclamation.41 
On virtually identical facts the court in Peevyhouse reached the opposite result 
and only allowed a recovery of the difference in value before and after the 
37 This must be within the bounds of reasonableness. If the contract called for construction of a house of 
average quality, the plaintiff cannot charge a defaulting contractor with the cost of finishing it off in luxury 
style with gold plated fixtures and the like. 
38 The American courts generally follow the rule of substantial performance and if the performing party's 
breach involves a trifling matter or one that is of little or no economic consequence to the other party, 
then the courts say that there is no liability because there is no injury. The most important opinion is 
that of Cardozo J in Jacob & Youngs Inc v Kent 230 NY 239, 129 NE 889 (1921). The plaintiff complained 
that the defendant used the wrong brand of pipe for the plumbing in a new house. That was true, but 
there was no liability because the pipe used was of a similar quality, and, furthermore, it would have 
been wasteful to rip the pipe out of the walls just to replace it with another brand. The result might be 
different in a case involving a peculiarly personal contract, as, for example, one to prepare a custom 
made suit. Brown v Foster 113 Mass 136 (1873). A party may ensure particular performance by making 
it a condition to the reciprocal obligation to pay and not merely a covenant of performance. See, eg Waynick 
Constr Inc v York 70 NC App 287, 319 SE 2d 304 (1984); Winn v Aleda Constr Co 227 Va 304, 315 
SE 2d 193 (1984). There is no doubt, however, that the 'substantial performance' rule is accepted and 
applied throughout the US. See, eg Publicker Chem Corp v Belcher Oil Co 792 F 2d 482 (5th Cir 1986); 
Schneider v Dumbarton Developers Inc 767 2d 1007 (DC Cir 1985); Restatement of Contracts, §§ 275, 
346 (1932); Farnsworth, Contracts, 1982, § 8.12. The UCC, however, contains a perfect tender rule 
in § 2-601 for sales of goods, but there are so many exceptions carved out by other sections of the UCC 
that there is effectively a substantial performance rule under that statute as well. H O Hunter, Modern 
Law of Contracts: Breach and Remedies, 1986, § 2.02[2]. See also Priest, 'Breach and Remedy for the 
Tender of Nonconforming Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic Approach', 91 
Harv L Rev 960 (1978). And see Part I of this article text at n 65ff. 
39 205 Minn 163, 286 NSW 253 (1939). 
40 382 P 2d 109 (Okla 1962). 
41 There was no requirement that plaintiff use the money to reclaim the land. He could spend it as he liked. 
Compare Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] Ch 106 at 332. 
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defendants began a strip-mining operation.42 Although the Peevyhouse opinion 
recognises that the cost to compelte is the normal measure of recovery, the 
opinion goes on to state that: 
Where the contract provision breached was merely incidental to the main purpose 
in view, and where the economic benefit which would result to [plaintiff] by full 
performance of the work is grossly disproportionate to the cost of performance, 
the damages which [plaintiff] may recover are limited to the diminution in value 
resulting to the premises because of the nonperformance.43 
The second Restatement generally follows the holding of the Peevyhouse 
case. Comment c to § 348 states, in part: 
If an award based on the cost to remedy the defects would clearly be excessive and 
the injured party does not prove the actual loss in value to him, damages will be 
based instead on the difference between the market price that the property would 
have had without the defects and the market price of the property with the defects. 
This diminution in market price is the least possible loss in value to the injured 
party, since he could always sell the property on the market even if it had no special 
value to him. 
This leaves little room for sentimental attachments to property or to any other 
interests not easily translated into the language of the marketplace. 
If the performing party breaches by reason of poor or defective performance 
as opposed to incomplete performance or unauthorised variations, then the 
solution is similar to that used to satisfy breach of warranty claims. The plaintiff 
can recover the 'difference in the value of the structure as built and the value 
of the structure as it should have been built'.44 That is essentially the same 
as the diminution in value formula of Peevyhouse, but the evidence most often 
used to prove the difference in value is the cost of repair, an approach to proof 
that borrows from the Groves case.45 One can, of course, draw a distinction 
between cases involving injury to the freehold (digging a rock quarry) and 
those involving defective construction of building. In the latter the cost of repair 
and the difference in value will usually be fairly closely connected, but land 
suitable for a quarry often is of relatively low value for other uses. Even if 
it is rendered virtually useless by a quarry pit, the total loss in value may well 
be substantially less than the cost of filling in the pit and reclaiming the land.46 
An interesting remedial problem that is beyond the scope of this paper is 
the following: Builder agrees with Owner to construct a building for, say, 
$100,000. The price fairly reflects costs and includes a reasonable profit. 
However, Owner's choice of building is wrong for the location or the times 
and its construction does little or nothing to enhance the value of the land; 
indeed, a potential buyer of the land would discount its value by the cost of 
42 Reclamation would have cost $29,000. The jury awarded $5000. Because the jury's award was greater 
than the value of the land in the first place the court reduced this to $300, which it found to be the diminution 
in value. 
43 382 P 2d 109 at 114. 
44 Jack v Heard Contractors Inc v Moriarty 185 Ga App 317 at 318 (1987). Compare Bellgrove v Eldridge 
(1954) 90 CLR 613. 
45 Jack v Heard Contractors Inc v Moriarty 185 Ga App 317 at 318 (1987). See also, Ray v Strawsrra 183 
Ga App 622, 359 SE 2d 376 (1987); Bales v Martin 737 SW 2d 46 (Tex App 1987). 
46 The lingering problem is the one of choice. Would the landowner have sold the mineral rights without 
the covenant of reclamation? If so, would the landowner have demanded a higher price? If the defendant 
never intended to comply with the reclamation covenant, should there be an action for deceit? 
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razing the structure. If the Builder breaches, should Owner's claim be calculated 
by reference to Owner's idiosyncratic interest in this building or should Owner 
be limited by principles of economic efficiency and the avoidance of waste 
to calculations based on the objective market value of the structure and the 
land even though that might result in a net recovery of zero? If the 'purpose 
of contract damages is solely to indemnify for actual loss, not to deter breach'47 
then perhaps Owner may have little cause for complaint. That overlooks, 
however, Builder's promise to construct a building of a certain quality for a 
certain price without regard to its ultimate market value. Certainly there are 
times when owners choose to improve properties in ways that are not objectively 
sound from an economic perspective, but the owners' eccentricities may not 
be a good excuse for the performing party's failure. Recognising this kind 
of problem as well as others having to do with foreseeability, waste, efficiency 
and so forth, the drafters of the second Restatement suggested that courts have 
wide leeway in fitting damages to particular circumstances. Section 351(3) 
states: 
A court may limit damages for foreseeable loss by excluding recovery for loss of 
profits, by allowing recovery only for loss incurred in reliance, or otherwise if it 
concludes that in the circumstances justice so requires in order to avoid dis-
proportionate compensation.48 
Criticisms of the Dominant American View on 
Quantum Meruit Recoveries after Contract Breaches 
In the Susi case the court referred to those relatively few cases holding the 
contract price to be a ceiling on recovery as 'illogical'. But more than a few 
American commentators have concluded that the opposite is true; there is less 
logic on the side of the majority view. Commentators in England and Australia 
have also been critical of the majority view.49 
This whole area of the law has an air of mystery about it. In the ordinary 
contract action, the contract itself is the measuring device. There are many 
instances in which a quantum meruit recovery is preferred, such as situations 
giving rise to a quasi-contract claim or disputes arising from agreements that 
do not have definite price terms.50 If the parties have agreed upon a consid-
eration, however, courts usually look to that consideration as the guideline 
for awarding damages. In this context the casees that allow a plaintiff to 
47 Simon, 'A Critique of the Treatment of Market Damages in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts', 81 
Colum L Rev 80 at 85 (1981). Professor Simon cites Nobs Chem USA Inc v Koppers Co 616 F 2d 212 
(5th Cir 1980); Coast Trading Co v Cudahy Co 592 F 2d 1074 (9th Cir 1979). 
48 For criticism of this and other damages provisions of the Second Restatement, see Harvey, 'Discretionary 
Justice Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts', 67 Cornell L Rev 666 (1982); Young, 'Half 
Measures', 81 Colum L Rev 19 (1981). In defence see E A Farnsworth, 'Ingredients in the Redaction 
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts', (1981) 81 Colum L Rev 1. Professor Farnsworth was Reporter 
for the second Restatement. His defence should not be surprising. 
49 See J W Carter, Breach of Contract, 1984, para 1212; Lindgren, Carter and Harland, Contract Law in 
Australia, 1986, para 2319; R Goff and G Jones, The Law of Restitution, 3rd ed, 1986, pp 467-8; Compare 
Ewan McKendrick, 'The Battle of the Forms and the Law of Restitution', (1988) 8 Oxford J Legal Stud 
197 at 206-7. 
50 Section 2-305 of the UCC, for example, expressly provides for contracts with open price terms and the 
statute as well as cases applying it suggest a variety of ways of determining a fair price. See, e g Spartan 
Grain & Mills Co v Ayers 517 F 2d 214 (5th Cir 1975). See also Goldberg, 'Price Adjustment in Long 
Term Contracts', 1985 Wis L Rev 527; Hillman, 'Court Adjustment of Long Term Contracts: An Analysis 
Under Modern Contract Law', 1987 Duke LJ 1. 
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sue 'off the contract for the market value of services rendered pursuant to 
the contract are anomalous. Courts may be trying to take into account the 
possibility of consequential damages that would not otherwise be recoverable, 
or they may be faced with a complex array of facts and interrelationships in 
which it is more difficult to determine actual reliance expenses and projected 
profits than to determine the market value of the work completed.51 Whatever 
the underlying pragmatic reasons for this approach it is one that is not strictly 
consistent with ordinary contract cases. 
There is another anomaly. The injured party has little incentive to seek 
damages 'off the contract unless the contract is a losing proposition or unless 
it is substantially below market rates. In most of these cases the contract has 
been a good one for the owner, and it does not appear to make sense for the 
owner to breach. Indeed, upon close examination there is often some question 
about the nature of the breach and whether one party wilfully repudiated or 
whether each party was, in some sense, at fault. If that is so, then it is incorrect 
to treat them all as if they were wilful, total repudiation cases. Professors 
Kessler and Gilmore offer a biting description of the typical case: 
The situation is that A has entered into a contract with B under which A for a price 
of $10,000, has agreed to do work which it becomes clear as the job progresses, 
will cost $20,000. Everyone agrees that, except for the remote possibility of 
reformation for mistake or something of the sort, A, if he completes the job, gets 
only $10,000. B merely has to sit tight, meanwhile punctiliously performing his 
own obligation under the contract, to get $20,000 worth of work for half of its cost. 
Under such circumstances is it plausible that B would ever lapse into a default which 
would allow A to get off the hook by 'rescinding' the contract and bringing his 
quantum meruit action for restitution? Yet, in case after case of this type, we are 
solemnly assured by the court that B did in fact 'default'. One possible explanation 
is [that] the actual situation is complicated and confused, there are mutual 
recriminations, each party accuses the other of bad faith, misconduct and faulty 
performance; until the judicial dice have been rolled, no one has the least idea of 
which side is in breach and which is not. Most opinions in litigation of this sort, 
however, become extremely cryptic at the point of explaining exactly what B's 
mysterious default consisted of.52 
Indeed it is odd that courts are so willing to ignore the parties' negotiated 
transaction and their own risk allocation. The substitution of a public law 
approach (payment for enrichment) for the private law of the contract is 
generally contrary to one of the major themes of contract law—respect for 
and enforcement of privately created law subject only to countervailing public 
policies of overriding importance. The public policy behind most of restitution 
is the prevention of unjust enrichment. Usually the defendant has converted 
or detained property, abused a trust, or received materials or services for which 
he or she should have paid. More often than not the defendant's action is tortious 
or very close to being tortious. The plaintiff may have the option to sue in 
tort for damages or in restitution for return of the property taken or for 
51 This may not always be true. The transactional costs of proving fair market value (eg testimony from 
third parties, discovery disputes, evidentiary disputes, the greater likelihood of appealable error) may 
be quite substantial. 
52 Kessler and Gilmore, Contracts, 2nd ed, 1970, p 1060. See also Childres and Garamella, 'The Law of 
Restitution and the Reliance Interest in Contract', (1969) 64 Nw Ul Rev 433. 
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disgorgement of unjustly acquired gain. The concept of restitution allows a 
court to fashion a remedy that provides the plaintiff with a money remedy 
equivalent to the market value of the goods or services provided by the plaintiff 
or taken by the defendant. This restitution approach to remedies may be much 
more suitable, for example, in a case involving the provision of services or 
the wrongful taking of something like a mineral right. Ordinary trespass 
damages may be insufficient and it may be impossible for the defendant to 
'restore' anything. Imposition of a promise to pay can force the defendant at 
least to pay fair value.53 
The unjust enrichment cases are conceptually simple. There is little quarrel 
with the notion that one should pay for or restore (together with profits 
therefrom) property that is wrongfully taken or detained. Similarly, there is 
no quarrel with the notion that a knowing and willing54 recipient of benefits 
should pay for those benefits. The difficulty presented by the cases considered 
in this paper is the extension of principles of restitution to cover a failed contract 
in which it is not unjust in any public law sense for the defendant to have 
received or to have retained services or goods. The plaintiff was required by 
the contract to provide the services or goods and there was no abuse of trust 
or taking of property when the defendant received them. Of course the defendant 
is expected to pay, but that expectation arises from the contract and not from 
a publicly imposed duty. The private law origin of this expectation is abundantly 
clear in the rule that the plaintiff who performs in full has a claim for the contract 
price, as on a debt, and for nothing more.55 
The extension of restitution beyond unjust enrichment is not a recent 
development. One line of cases, well illustrated by Britton v Turner,56 used 
restitutionary principles to avoid the harsh result that the law of unilateral 
contracts demanded. In Britton the plaintiff was a farm labourer who had agreed 
to work for 12 months for a total lump sum consideration of $120.57 The 
labourer quit after almost 10 months of work. The defendant argued that there 
was no liability because the plaintiff did not complete his agreed upon per-
formance. This was the standard law of unilateral contracts,58 but the plaintiff 
was allowed to recover upon a count in quantum meruit for the reasonable 
worth of his labour.59 The defendant's argument was that the plaintiff's 
unexcused failure to complete performance destroyed the contract and any 
obligation on the part of the defendant. There was substantial support 
for this argument and against any suggestion of recovery on a quantum meruit.60 
53 This may be an especially useful remedy where the plaintiff has no real out of pocket loss, but only a 
lost opportunity, yet the defendant has a substantial gain. See eg Roberts v Sears, Roebuck & Co 575 
F 2d 976 (7th cir 1978); Matarese v Moore-McCormack Lines Inc 158 F 2d 631 (2d Cir 1946). 
54 The 'knowing and willing' limitation excludes claims by the official intermeddler who, by unilateral acts, 
seeks to make another his or her debtor. 
55 Perhaps there could be a claim for consequential damage, eg for late payment, subject to the rules of 
foreseeability, but, even so, that claim would arise from the contract and not from some external principle 
of justice. 
56 6 NH 481 (1834). 
57 The facts are not discussed in detail in the opinion, but, in the normal course, a farm hand would have 
received room and board and sundry other in-kind payments during the year and have been paid his cash 
wages after the harvest. 
58 For the standard distinction between unilateral and bilateral contracts see Restatement of Contracts, § 
12 (1932). 
59 The recovery was $95, almost precisely the proportionate amount that would have been due had the contract 
provided for monthly instalment payments. 
60 See, eg Starke v Parker 19 Mass 267 (1824); Giles v Edwards (1797) 7 TR 181, 101 ER 920. 
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Nevertheless, the court held that the defendant had been enriched by almost 
ten months of labour and that, having been willing to pay for this labour in 
the first place, it would be unfair to allow the defendant to retain the benefit 
of the labour without payment. Today the Britton case probably would be 
decided in accordance with one of the following rules of contract law: 
(a) part performance by the promisee acts as acceptance and creates a binding, 
bilateral agreement;61 
(b) part performance by the promisee estops the promisor from denying and 
thereby avoiding the promise to pay;62 
(c) unless clearly impossible, the parties' actions should be construed to imply 
a bilateral agreement.63 
In his influential treaties entitled The Law of Quasi Contracts, published 
in 1913, Woodward simply expanded the concept of quasi-contract to include 
cases that involved the receipt of a benefit that it was neither wrongful to receive 
nor wrongful in any general sense to keep whether or not there was an 
enrichment of the defendant's estate. This was a departure from the approach 
of Keener who published A Treatise on the Law of Quasi-Contracts in 1893. 
Keener's thesis was that quasi-contract, as an outgrowth of restitutionary 
principles, was wholly independent of contract. It was a body of law based 
upon legal duty and the concept of justice as opposed to contract, which had 
its basis solely in private agreement. Keener's distinction between contract 
and quasi-contract became an accepted principle of American law.64 But Keener 
limited quasi-contract to cases of unjust enrichment, and did not include cases 
involving what might be called the 'just' receipts of benefits, the broader range 
encompassed by Woodward in his more sweeping definition of the term. The 
first Restatement of Contracts tended to follow the Woodward approach, and 
the second Restatement borrows from both Kenner and Woodward. 
The Restatement (Second) ignores the conflict between the rationales of 
'unjust enrichment' and 'receipt of benefit', frequently basing its rhetoric upon 
the former while grounding its operative rules primarily on the latter. When 
a proper case for restitution is advanced, the Restatement (Second) usually 
allows recovery for benefits conferred whether or not the defendant has been 
enriched in estate.65 
Despite apparent approval of a rather broad understanding of quasi-contract, 
the drafters of the second Restatement did retreat somewhat from the proposition 
that the contract—if there is one—does not limit the recovery in failed contract 
cases where the plaintiff is allowed to sue 'off the contract. The first Re-
statement clearly followed what is the dominant American view as set forth 
61 This rule was adopted to avoid the unilateral contract problem presented by a case such as Britton. See 
Restatement of Contracts § 31 (in cases of doubt an agreement should be treated as bilateral) and § 45 
(part performance equals acceptance) (1932); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 50 (1981); UCC, 
§ 2-206; Lincoln National Life Ins Co v NCR Corp V Wilshire 135 Cal 654, 67 P 1086 (1902); Hill Aircraft 
Corp v Planes Inc 158 Ga App 151, 279 SE 2d 250 (1981). Compre Billings Cottonsdeed Inc v Albany 
oil mill Inc 173 Ga App 825, 328 SED 2d 426 (1985). 
62 See, eg Siegel v Codner 153 Ga App 438, 265 SE 2d 287, aff'd 246 Ga 368, 271 SE 2d 465 (1980); 
Marchiondo v Scheck 78 NM 440, 432 P 2d 405 (1967); Powers Construction Co Inc v Salem Carpets 
Inc 322 SE 2d 30 (SC App 1984). 
63 See, eg Davis v Jacoby, 1 Cal 2d 370; 34 P 2d 1026 (1934). 
64 See A L Corbin, 'Quasi-Contractual Obligation', (1912) 21 Yale LJ 533; Dawson, Unjust Enrichment 
(1951); Perillo, 'Restitution in a Contractual Context', (1973) 73 Colum L Rev 1208. 
65 perillo, 'Restitution in the Second Restatement of Contracts', (1981) 81 Colum L Rev 37 at 38. 
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in cases such as Susi v Zara, discussed above.66 This also seems to be the 
view expressed in § 373(2) of the second Restatement, but comment b to 
§ 374 suggests that the contract price should set a cap on recovery. In one 
of the earlier drafts, there was an explicit rejection of the dominant view and 
a clear statement that the contract price should set a cap on recovery.67 Professor 
Farnsworth, the reporter for the second Restatement, has said that it is neutral 
on the subject and that it neither approves nor disapproves the use of the contract 
price to limit restitutionary recoveries in failed contract cases.68 The ambiguity 
of the second Restatement may be frustrating to scholar and lawyer, but that 
ambiguity may accurately reflect uncertainties69 among legal academics and 
practising lawyers, uncertainties that may well find their way into judicial 
opinions. Certainly among legal scholars the trend is toward a healthy 
skepticism of the reasoning in cases such as Susi v Zara. Professor Perillo's 
comments are particularly in point: 
Restitution for breach is a contractual remedy; consequently, it seems inappropriate 
to ignore the parties' allocation of the risks. Should a plaintiff who would have lost 
on the contract receive an amount that not only spares him from further loss but 
also compensates him as if he had made a profitable bargain? Perhaps, on the 
erroneous assumption that the restitutionary action is divorced from the contract 
upon which the performance was based, that a contractual breach necessarily involves 
fault, or that the defendant is profiting from his own breach if he uses the contract 
to shield against greater liability. This last thought ignores the fact that the defendant's 
profit, if any, stems from the parties' bargain and not from any subsequent 
wrongdoing.70 
Oliver Wendell Holmes' statement that the 'duty to keep a contract at common 
law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it—and 
nothing else',71 has become a commonly accepted and fundamental principle 
of the American common law of contract. It is central to the theory of efficient 
breach which has been ably and amply developed by law and economic 
scholars.72 The Holmes' view simply does not work if the non-breaching party 
can sue 'off the contract. Consider, for example, the owner who determines 
that finishing a building project does not make sense because the market 
66 Above, see text at n 3. 
67 Tentative Draft number 14, § 387(2) (1979). 
68 Farnsworth, Contracts, 1982, § 913, n 22. 
69 The original idea behind the various Restatements was to draw together the doctrines of contracts, torts, 
property, etc into comprehensive collections of black letter principles, amplified by comments and 
illustrations. The goal was to re-state the law, not to re-form it. There is little doubt that the opinions 
of the various drafters have made their way into each of the Restatements and that each of these has tended 
to define the law as well as to describe it. The ambiguities of the second Restatement in this area, however, 
are probably more consistent with the original goal than a firm statement one way or the other would 
have been. 
70 Perillo, 'Restitution in the Second Restatement of Contracts', (1981) 81 Colum L Rev 37 at 44-5. 
71 O W Holmes, 'The Path of the Law', (1987) 10 Harv L Rev 457 at 462. 
72 See, eg Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law, (1977) pp 88-90; Barton, 'The Economic Basis of Damages 
for the Breach of Contract', (1972) 1 Legal Studies 277; Birmingham, 'Breach of Contract, Damage 
Measures, and Economic Efficiency', (1970) 24 Rutgers L Rev 273; Goetz & Scott, 'Liquidated Damages, 
Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of 
Efficient Breach', (1977) 77 Colum L Rev 554. For a critique of the theory of 'efficient breach', see 
Craswell, 'Contract Remedies, Renegotiation and the Theory of Efficient Breach', (1988) 61 So Calif 
L Rev 630. For a different normative approach, see Fried, Contract As Promise (1981). See also Linzer, 
On the Amorality of Contract Remedies—Efficiency, Equity and the Second Restatement', (1981) 81 
Colum L Rev 111; Michelman, 'Norms and Normativity in The Economic Theory of Law', (1978) 62 
Minn L Rev 1015. 
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has changed or the project was not properly designed for the time or location. 
If it would be economically wasteful to carry through, then to serve the goal 
of an efficient allocation of resources the owner should halt the project and 
terminate the contract. For the owner to be able to make a rational choice he 
needs to have some idea of relative costs, and, in the normal course, he should 
be able to look to the contract. Full performance will cost $x; a termination 
after partial performance should cost less, but no more, if what Holmes said 
was true. However, if the performing party is free to sue 'off the contract 
and to try to prove that the value of the work to date exceeded the contract 
price,—$Y—then the owner has difficulty in making a rational economic 
decision. Indeed, it may be impossible to do so.73 
Despite the theoretical and practical criticisms of the rule established by cases 
such as Susi v Zara, that rule is still the prevailing one. Contracting parties 
have to contend with the apparent anomaly that in some cases, under some 
circumstances, a breach will have consequences beyond the normal. General 
principles of equity and justice may be employed to sort out the claims of one 
party to a broken contract against the other party. 
Much of the conceptual confusion in this area probably derives from the 
use of the term 'restitution' as a shorthand description for certain categories 
of contract damages. A two part article published in the Yale Law Journal 
52 years ago by Professors Fuller and Perdue has been exceptionally important 
in categorising contract remedies.74 Fuller and Perdue identified three 
categories: (a) the expectancy remedy; (b) the reliance remedy; and (c) the 
restitution remedy. 
The expectancy remedy is the usual 'benefit of the bargain' remedy whereby 
the plaintiff recovers the profit expected on the transaction. Although it is the 
classic, 'pure' substitutional remedy, more than a few plaintiffs have found 
it to be unsatisfactory because recovery of the expectancy rarely includes 
recovery of the transaction costs, especially attorney's fees, associated with 
establishing and enforcing the remedy.75 
The goal of the reliance remedy is to return the plaintiff to the status quo 
ante by requiring the defendant to pay the costs incurred to date by the plaintiff. 
This approach is used most frequently when it is difficult or impossible to 
determine the plaintiff's expected profit or when it appears that there was to 
be little or no profit.76 Practically, it is a way to provide the non-defaulting 
party with his or her costs. Conceptually, the goal of the reliance remedy is 
fundamentally different from that of the expectancy remedy. The idea is not 
to reach the monetary equivalent of specific performance and thereby to recreate 
the contract, but to reach the position that would have existed for the plaintiff 
if there had not been a transaction. The expectancy recovery affirms the 
73 If both parties have made a bad deal, one commentator has suggested an allocation of loss, on an early 
termination, that is consistent with the relative losses each would have sustained on full performance. 
Dobbs, Remedies, 1973, § 12-24 at 912-24. No court has embraced this approach, most probably because 
the calculations necessary to accomplish the desired result would be too complicated and would be wasteful 
of scarce judicial resources. 
74 Fuller and Perdue, 'The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages', (1936) 46 Yale LJ 52. 
75 See H O Hunter, Modern Law of Contracts: Breach and Remedies, 1986, § 11.02; E A Farnsworth, 
'Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract', (1970) 70 Colum L Rev 1145. 
76 See, eg McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission (1951) 84 CLR 377. 
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existence of a contract; the reliance recovery tries to deny it.77 
The term 'restitution' as used by Fuller and Perdue is a term of art to describe 
remedial approaches that have their conceptual roots in notions of equity and 
fair dealing. The goal is to make the breaching party give up or pay for an 
unfair gain, and the focus of the remedy is on the defendant rather than on 
the plaintiff. Older cases tended to resort to restitutionary remedies when the 
usual contract remedies were inadequate to do justice or when some legal 
principle prevented a normal damage recovery.78 
The Fuller and Perdue categorisation of contract remedies has been useful, 
and it has had an enormous impact. The outline of their article is followed 
in § 344 of the second Restatement with no significant variations. Professor 
Hudec has noted that many of the leading cases on contract remedies cite and 
rely on the Fuller and Perdue article.79 Their method of analysis even seems 
to permeate opinions when the judge and lawyers are not consciously aware 
of the article. Professor Danzig chronicled an interesting lawsuit against a plastic 
surgeon in which the counsel for the both sides as well as the trial judge applied 
the reliance interest principles as discussed by Fuller and Perdue even though 
all appeared to be ignorant of the specific article.80 If nothing else the Danzig 
study suggests how firmly established the article has become as part of the 
received wisdom in American contract law. 
Therefore, it may not be surprising that a court might turn to restitutionary 
remedies in a complicated case where it is difficult to determine the expectancy 
or to separate out all the costs. It may seem an appropriate and straightforward 
way to do 'justice' and to prevent a contract breacher from avoiding liability, 
or what the court considers to be appropriate liability. The difficulty, of course, 
is that in doing so the court substitutes public law principles of justice for the 
private law created by the parties. This approach also ignores the parties' own 
freely made risk allocations and introduces an element of uncertainty into the 
contract that makes it more difficult to decide, rationally, whether, it is better 
to continue the contract or whether it makes more sense to terminate. 
Restitution also has played some role in cases of frustrated contracts where 
courts have been reluctant to leave the parties in their respective positions at 
the time of frustration because to do so would be unjust. The frustration cases 
do not provide a happy model for the resolution of disputes that grow out of 
breaches for the straightforward reason that frustration usually arises from 
77 The reliance remedy presents the possibility of several problems. What are reasonable costs? What if 
the costs are greater than the contract price? (Generally, the plaintiff has to bear the excess.) How does 
a court take into account lost opportunities and other consequential losses? See H O Hunter, Modern 
Law of Contracts: Breach and Remedies, 1986, §§ 7.02[3], 7.03[4][C], 7.04; E A Farnsworth, 'Legal 
Remedies for Breach of Contract', (1970) 70 Colum L Rev 1145. 
78 See H O Hunter, Modern Law of Contracts: Breach and Remedies, 1986, § 7.02[4]. 
79 Hudec, 'Restating the Reliance Interest', (1982) 67 Cornell L Rev 704 at 705. 
80 The case was Sullivan v O'Connor, 363 Mass 579; 296 NE 2d 183 (1973) discussed in Danzig, The 
Capability Problem in Contract Law, 1978, pp 5-43. Although Sullivan appears to be a medical malpractice 
case, it was really one for breach of warranty. The 'nose job' that the defendant surgeon performed on 
plaintiff did not turn out as wel as she expected or as he had warranted. For a somewhat similar case 
see Hawkins v McGee 84 NH 114, 146 A 641 (1929) (doctor said that operation on boy's crabbed hand 
would make it a 100 per cent good hand', but operation was less than perfect; held, breach of an express 
warranty). 
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some externality81 rather than from a deliberate act of one of the parties. 
Furthermore, to the extent that restitutionary principles have been applied in 
frustrated contract cases, it has been more to restore something like a pre-
payment than to provide a recovery on a quantum meruit.82 
81 Determining what is an acceptable 'externality' that justifies the frustration defense is itself a matter of 
some difficulty as shown by the American cases on commercial impracticability under, § 2-615 of the 
UCC. See generally, Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code, 1983, Vol 41, § 2-615; 3 Hawkland 
UCC Series, 1982, § 2-615. 
82 See generally, Goff and Jones The Law of Restitution, 3rd ed, 1986, pp 484-504. 
